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Frief- com-eg$.ary
t * The crucial irrportance of eafegtrard.s to enanr€ that nuclear rnateriale
e.r,s not unlarrfullf diverted. for nilitary purpoges or for the pirt?o8e of
narufactu.ning exploeiv€s Haa rocognized at the beginning of the atomic sra
and wae strossed. once again in the conmuni.cation froro the Commiseion to the
Couneil in February lgli entitled, reAn enerry stratery for the Conrnunity:
the nuclear aspectltt*" Emphaeis tras placed', in partj'cular, on the fact
that the sitnation of tho connunity in tnis field. wag unique in tbat itj.nvolveC the coerietenc€ of tuo nul"tlnational sa"feguard qratensr one on s
rogional snd the other on & rorld'+lide scalc.
Z, For tbis reasoll, the Connigsion undertook to report to the Council
on the inplenentation of the Verification Agreements concluded' by Erraton
and. its Henber $tates with the Interna'tional atonic Enerry Agency
IU"*iLit"r called. The Agency) rbicb provide e lega1 basie for thie
ooe-igtence.
Ilbe attecbed report fuuile that und.ertaking.
3.
by
Since the rcPort
the Coumissiono it
ln question ig the flrst of its kind to be prod'uced
ls neceeserSr to furrrish soulc historical background''
This background. hinges on thc folloring polntel
(") d.ifferencGs between the Enraton safeguard'e system, ect up in\-' iifg, and that of the Agency, with particular regand to the scoP€t
the end's and. the IDGenE;
(r)
(")
the i-nfluence
lnto force in
on Burston sa^feguard.s of the negotiation
thecarlylg?Osofthel[on-Proliferation
and entrY
Treaty (rPt);
thc structure and
conclud.ed in APril
ldenber States and
eaLient featuree of the Verification Agreemsnt
1973 between Errraton, it8 lloD-tlllclean-.weapon
the AgpncY;
*cou(Bz ) le of P FobruarY 1982.
iI
I
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(A) differences between that Agreenent ald those of the sane t]rye
concludect by the Agency wiin non-cornmrnity countries that did
not possess rnrclear ,r"Lporr" and. were eignatories to the NPTr
ard., to a lesser aegreel differelces with respect to the
.Agreenent conclud'ed. between the Agency a,rrd. Japen in 19-|7;
(") verification Agreements between E\*aton, the united King$on a*d
the Agency a^nd. betwu"r, zu"atom, France a.nd' the Agency, signed
in 1976 a'd 19?S respectivelyn'which take account of the status
of those countries as lfuclear Powerel
(f) reasons wly the 19?3 Agreenent could not be fq1ly applied bsfore
1977 i
(S) intensification of the approech to non-Prollferation on the
broadest international ulires particularly after the rnctian
atornlc explosion of 1974 ard'tle new aSency requirements concertring
tbe p"o""iores for implerenting the lgreenent;
(n) repeciar arrangements' of a provigionar nature that came into
effect between the parties concerned. befu*eenr 1977 and" 1980'
4. a Llttle over three yeare has passed si'nce the last of the
aborrementioned. special amaxgements was nade'
rnre conmission consequently feels that the councilfs attention shoulcL
be drawn to firrd.ing' as ,ui"ra" tlu progress made in the application
of the verlficatlon Agreemlnt as far as tbe non-nucrear-ryeapon Mernber
Statee are concerned.
It wouId., however, bu premature to d'o like,,ise as regarrls the Agreements
conclud.ed with the United' Kingdom and' with trtcance' firstly because they
entered into force more 1.u""ohy and. seoordry becauee the solution of
certain problems that arise in the contert of the first Agreenent
6i*t);.'Jeht have favourable repercussions on the application of theiatter (Ntrs)*.
5. First of aII, lt should. be polnted' out that a great d'eal bas been
achieved.
Alrnost 7V/" of the fffacilj.ty attachmentsrr** hav€ been finalized.. The
renaining l&"r-*o"t- or 
"nitu rerate to snarl 
guanti-ties of materiare t
n111 be ao bY the erd of this fa&Pr
rn additionl satisfactory a$angenents bave been nade with regard' to
tno key points, nanely tire pla'ning of i.nspections aod, the information
which E*raton is reg*ired. t; fi:rnish to thl agency. Ttre ag3eenent is
thus effectively in oPeration'
-
NNHS: Non-nuclear+reapon states'
**NtlS: lfuclear-+Ieapon states'
w this term is meant the arrangements subsidiary to the basic
Agleement which d.efine the proced.ures for applyrng safeguards
insta[ation bY installation'
!./ 
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S" Nevert,heless, a nunber of problens a;'ose as the implementa't:"on of
*he Agreenent prCIg:ressed.n tlney are Cescribed in the report' Some
of then f,iere detected by the comrn:-rdty insPectors themselvest while
nthere were notified" to the conniseion by tb"e lr{ember state Governnents
or by the oPerators concerned.
?* Ihrrins 19$ar et the Coruuissionts behest, the w.rk of the Liaison
Som.ittees provid.eil for {n the Ag3eernent was considerabtr'y speeded" up
for the very purpose of obterruing a betten und.ersta'd.ing of these
probJ.ens a# sf expLorin6 possible solutions.
8. lflne comrnission is irdeed. alrare that aome of these problens can
be solved only through a protracted' effgrt based on a prccess of
continrally ad.apting the Lpplication of the Agreement to a reality
whlch ie chang:ing frout boti the guantttative ant the g*alitative point
of vie*'r"
Fnrthermore, it i.s faced. rith preciee deadlinee: for exa'nple, two of
the specia} agan€pments na^de d'uring the period' 197?-BO expire in
septenber igg3l hence the need. to activate the dialogue not only with
the .Agency hrt' also with the lvtsnber states and the operators in the
conurrrity in orrler to collect as mrrch infornation and as many opinions
arB possible witb a view to propoeing in Sood tirne the coafirnation or
noairication of the affangenents in guestion.
$. l[hre fact that the Eoard. of Governors of the Agency, at its next
neeting j"n Februarxr will holcl a thorough d.iscussion on the problens
that arise in the application of saf,eguard's, on tbe solutions that
can be considered arld. on the prospects of improving the system, pronrpts
the comsd ssionl f or it s part , to a^nalyse in greater detai I the
application of tbe Verificatian Agreement in consultation wi'th the
lfiEnber States.
'lO" lttre Commission further believee that the application of the
Terificatlon A€reenent rmrst be assessed. in a broader context, account
being taken of the great importamce of the Agencyf s safeguards system
to th.e d.evelopnent of internatlonal trad'e in nuclear materials "
aacount nmst al_so be taken of the fact that the relations between the
corururuity a'd. tbe Agency go far beyord cooperation in bhe application
of Terification Agreements.
11 . llbe cornmi ssion invites tbe councir to consid-er this report. rt
also calls upon the Mernber states to erpress their views on the various
points rid.sed. thereino
ltlne views expressed. will be of assistance to the coruuission in its
firrtherworkinthisfield.asawho]-e.
-4-
flre comrnission further proposes that the report be sent to the ltlemben
Stateer Representatlves to tbe Agencyl with the request that they
bear it in urind in the context of comrsunity coordination, particularry
ln vlew of tne forthconlng meeting of the Board' of Governore on
22Febnrary19B3.Attt.litmeeting,theBoardwi11d.isG.ussr3@r
the present 
"i"trr" of the Agencyrs-safeguar''d.s 
a^rd' waye ald' means of
luproving the sYstem.
J/
Report on the'impLementation of the Verification Agreements
conctuded by Euratom and its Member States rith the
InternationaL Atomic Energy Agency
I. Introduction
1. The present report is a follow-up of the communication "An Energy
Strategy for the Community: the nucLear aspects", sent by the
Commission to the CounciI in February 1982 (*), in which the
ComnrissioS undertook, inter aLia, to pLace bef ore the Counci L a
fuLt reporrt on the imptementation of the three Verification
Agreementis between Euratom, i ts vari ous Flember States and the
Internati,ona L Atomi c Energy Agency (herei naf ter ref erred to as
the Agenc'y)
III - 
-The Euratrom Saf eg-ua rd-s Systqg \
I
?. Under ArtlicLe 2(e) of the Euratom T reaty, the Community has the task
to,,make icertain, by appropriate supervisiono that nucLear materiats
are not diverted to purposes other than those for uhich they are
i ntended".
Chapter VII of the Tre.aty provides a saf eguards system whi ch enabLes
the Community to discharge this basic task.
5. The main features of this system may be out[ined as folLows:
(a) 9Sepe"ALt nucLear materiaLs,
safeguards, excePt for
regui rements;
'incLuding ores' are subject to
certain materiaLs intended to meet defence
(b) !iE:.
The Community must ensure, on the jnternaI Leve[, that safeguarded
materiaLs are not diverted from their intended and decLared uses-
0n the gllgrS*L teveL, the community must ensure the respect of
,,anyparffisafeguardingobLigat.ions,.arisingfrornits
internationaL agreements" In other words' it must verify that anY
obIigat.ions contracted towarcls thi rd states" as to the uses at
materiaLs they suppLyu are compLied with in the comrnun'i ty" The
comnrunity may aLso ro:upurate with exterrraL safeguards authorities:
Euratom activi ti es in tlti s f i e Ld ane thus open to' and may be
integrated intC)o worLdwide deveLopments' as foreseen in another basic
p.ouision of the TneatyrnanreLy ArticLe ?(h);
Fina L Ly i t rnust ensure respect f or the prot'i sisons of the Treaty
relati ng to suPPLY " f ...
(*) COM (82) 36 Finat
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tc) !9919.- CFi6ier vII of the Treaty, besides setting out the commission's
safeguards obl-igations, Lndous it vith appropriate pouers for.
"nrriing their iutfitmint: 
nanety the rights to obtain knowLedge
of basii technicaI characteristics of nuctear instatlationsi to
require tne teeping-and production of records permitting accounting
for nuctear rmterials;to nake inspectionsl and to appLy sanctions-
fhe freaty' moreover estabLishes a direct reLationship betHeen the
communi ty 
"na 
tn"-opli"ioit, tt a tfEil!'ilFTEEEgutatorv'
executjv; and judiciaL teve[s: Euraton safeguards are thus
supranati onat.
4. The comprehensive nature of the Euratom safeguards system has.dispensed
l|emberstatesfromtheneedtosetupnationa[systems.Anditis
interesting to note that, prior to the entry into force of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NP;), that is to say f rom '1958 to 1970' att
third states uhich conctuded co-operation agreements }lith the Comrnunity
*"a" aont"nt to re[y on EuFatom safeguards alone to supervise respect
of such agreements Hithin the Community'
III. Imoact of the NPT on the Euratom Safeguards
5. At the time of the negotiation of the NPT, the Community Has obtiged to
reftect as Hhether changes nere needed in its safeguarding system, taking jnto
account, in particular. the fact that its charactiristics differ very sub-
stantiatty ftom those of the safeguards system of the InternationaL Atomic
Energy Agency.
The Agencyes system:
(a) is of HorLdbJide, as opposed to regionaI appLication;(b) is not supranat'ionaL, being based instead ()n contractuaI
reLationships between the Agency and each istate concerned;(e) does not cover ores;(d) is aimed at ensuring peacefuL use of safeguarded materiaLs,
and cloes not deal with more specific obligations such as those
contained in the community's agreements Hith eertain key supp[-ier
States,
ReLiaRfe by the eommr.rn'ity on tlre AEencyrs system alene wouLd have had tuuo
undesi rabLe consequences- Fi rst, it '*JouLd have given rise to probLems
eoncerft.ii.rg the Comrnun'ity's agreements Hith suppL-'ier States" Secondn it
Houf.d lrave Lecj to rept-acem*rlt of an enduring system' f i rmIy anchored
iyr eomrnunity Lawo by CIne based on internatienaL agreements aLone. In
these circumst&nccs, tlre Ccmrnun'ity took the view that its safe-
quai'ds sirstem shouLC be maintained"
6, Thji; dec-!sion r,qaCr: it 
'lecessary to organise the coextstence 
of both
systemsr u"i th6r:t prejr-lCice to their specific eharactens/ since the'i r
rlneCI"-ordii-larled appL-i ,:atjon wouLd have'!mposed unacceptabLe burdens on
e ommunity CIperatilrs. Ii: wouLci aLso have denie'd to the Agency the
henef .i :s ef the f ommuriityrs rnl!LtinationaL saf erguards system-
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7- The ajm of ensuring cLose co-ordination of the tuo systems in the
implernentation of the NPT hras given its first concrete expression
in the Agreement signed by the Community, its Non-l'luctear Weapon
States (NNtdS) and the Agency on 5 Apri L 1973 (the Verif ication
lgreement).
It ftowed naturaLty from Artic[e III of the NPT' uhich reads
"o.. Non-NucLear Weapon States Party to the Treaty shaLL conc[ude
agreements nith the InternationaL Atomic Energy Agency -.r either
individuaILv or together w'i th other States --.'
IV. The Veri f icat ion Agreement betusgl{-Urglem its NNlrls and the enc
and reIated documents
A. Structure
s-@ 
*Giffrltl@
tE. The Agree'ment has a'complex structure which may be summarised as fotlotds:
i(a) fhe main bo4y, o,f t foLlous, w'ith certain signif icant
exce ftein of the Agency's NPT Agreements'
as Llid down in the B[ue Book (1);
I(b) A protocot sets out speciaL provisions retating to the particular
naffiguratom saf egua rds;
(c) Subsidiflry 4rlang.e$-ery!: (qsne:Ijli, part), .:p"citv in S!T!9IW
cation how the pr n the Agreemnit-ffi-5e applied'
fficLudetheRuLesandIv|qthodstobeusedforthecaLcu[ation
of inspection ef ecific e{ampLes- in this respectl
id) subsi d_i gry Lr.ransg_m,enls ql: gcLL nts) spec if Y o &Sj !-i tv -?v
+ffiity, hou tne Thev shou, 'inter aLia,
ffi-aif faci Lity, ih" inspection ef fort of both Euratom and the
AgencY;
{e} A number of SJrqc'iaL lrnpte-lne{!ing,yn4,ersjlald-i19: (Joint Tearns'
observatjcn ffi-) srpptement -the general part of the
Subsidiary Arrangements: they are houever separate documents-
The documerrts at (d) and (e) Here negotiated af tEr ent ry into f orce of
the Agreement in 1977 "
Amendments to the documents at (a) and (b) requi re' nat onLy apBrova['
by the c-aunci L" and hy the Agency's Bcard of Governors" but aLsn
rati f i e at ir:n by FSembei" $tates of the f cmmun i ty"
Hmendnrerrts ta the documents at {cJ, ufri Le ai,sc requi riilg apiinsvel hy
br:th the courici L anci Boardd are not subject to ratif icatir;n i:'r ivlemi:er$tat*,s. r.t shou Ld be noted tha't the it,: Les and ltethads mus t be revi ewec)
f ram t ime to tiine" te take into ae co';nt nekj tee hni:logicaL de'reLoptnelr'lsjn the {'ieLd of saf*guards and exFer-ienrce gained'
a
-[z t
tI) $ee AgencY
Ag neement s
the fUPT".,{n ffiaY ffi71
Ilosirrnent INf CIRC "!53' entit Ied o'Structure
Lretr*een tfre lAEA anej $tates requ j red i n
'this docrlrnentu appr*ved by the Agency's
" 
is Senerally knewn as 'nThe ffiLure Book"'
and Content ot
corineciion with
Board of, 6overn0rs
/ "-"
| 
\'itre \
I
I| -4
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documents at (d) may be anended uithout invotving the Counci t ,and
Board, foLLowjng, hoyever, under an internaL Cornrnunity arrangement,
ovaI by the f{ember State concerned-
The
the
appr
present of a tess enduri*g character: in
it is expressly provided that they ri Lt
B.
-t'
The documents at (e) 5re atparticutar, in some of,:them
expire at a fixed date.:
Specific Features
g. The specific features of the Verification Agreement may be outLined as
foLlovs 
= 
"-:
-:.2..
it is recogni sed that l{ember States have assi gned to the Comrntrni ty
yide po**.i which cover aLI essentiat etements of safeguards, and
that the Community,fl6s the task of ensuring, in Line with NPT
provisions, that nuclear materiaLs on the territories of its NNI'JS
are not diverted to nucLear Heapons or other nuclear explosjve
devi ces;
the Agency is requi ned to take account of the effectiveness of Euratom
safeguards and to make ful.L use thereof sb as to avoid unnecessary
dupLi cation;
the Community is associated with the Agency in the examination of the
basic technj ca L characteristi cs of the instaL Lations;
the Community has the task of analysing the reports transmitted by
ope rators I
ctose co-operation'is contempLated betsreen the tuo authorities durring
i nspect i ons;
the number, intensity and procedures of Agency inspections are to be
determined according to the Ru[es and Methods. These Lay down the
inspection efforts of both Euratom and the Agency in respect of
spec-if ic exampLes of f aci l.ities. These eff orts h,ere to be catcut.ated in such
a uay that the significant amount of materiaL unaccounted tor, to be
detected on a tjmety basis by the Agency, would be about four times
that to be detected by Euratom, The clear consequence of this ruLe Lras
that Agency activities shouLd be very substantiaLLy Lower than those
performed by the Euratom inspectorate, and aLso than those performed
by the Agency in thi rd States, ,
the Agency inspections are tQ be carried out'simuLtaneousIy with the
inspection activities of the Communit/, whi t.e Serlsit of the Eurittom
inspections are being Performed;
the Agency inspectjons areto be performed" as a generat ruLe, through
the observat'ion of f;i.lratom inspections "
'10, These provi si ons do not however rnean that the Agency shou Ld appLy i ts
safeguards.qn!y_ i:rdirectLy, by means of verif icat'ion of the effectiveness
of [urateim ffiguards. The Agreenient provide:; fsr independent saf r:-
guardir-ig nieasures by the Agency" and for inspection activities carried
out otherwise than through observat'ion of Euratom inspectors, whenever
thts exeeption to the observatjon princ'ipLe is foreseen'in the
1..
5*g 
-L
Subsidiary Arrangements, or in exceptionat circumstances* The
Verif icat'ion Agneement has thus resuLted in a situation '!n whi ch the
Community is the most effectiveLy safeguarded area in the worLd'
because of the concurrent operation of two muttinationat safeguarding
systems. Hr)rdever-. the precautions taken in the Agreement, and
referrred to above, are intended to keep the burden tor operators
nithin acceptabLe timits" and to be consistent with a prudent management
of the avaiLabLe resources. Furthermore, the independence of the
Euratom safeguards system is unaffected; the relations between Euratom
and the Rgenly are of a "horizontat" nature, as between tuo muttinationaL
inspectorates cc-operating with each other-
C. Com ri son wi th NPT Agreements conc Lqrlqglb the with third States
1't. The Agency has concluded a [arge number of NPT Agreements (74 such
"g"""i"nt, rrere in force on 15 JuLy 1gE2). They are, uithout exception,bised on the BLue Book (1). Under these agreenents, States are required
to set up nationat systems of accolnting for and control of nuctear
nater i a ts,lE6iG67 operators carry out measurements, take inventofies,
keep records and send reports to the States. These reports must be
transmitted in turn to the Agency. These agreenents are not based on the assump-
tion that the States' con ce rn-ed anatyse these reports or check them through
inspection or appLy sandtions. There are thus radicaI differences between
the verification Agreement and the agreements conctuded by the Agency t'{ith
third states.
12. horever, one of the NPT Agreements conctuded by the Agency constitutes
a speciat case. The Agretment betHeen the Agency and Japan' signed.on
4 tilarch 19ZZ (INFCIRC 255), departs significantLy from the Btue Book
and presents tess obvious differences from the Verification Agreement'
Conttary to the standard NPT agreements:
- JaDan undertakes to operate a conplete nationaL safeguarding system,
. inc tuding i nsPe ct i ons I
- the main body of the Agreement is supplemented by a Protocot' which
fotlows ctearty the paitern of the ProtocoI to the Verification
Agreement;
this protocoL inc Ludes a kind of "most-f avoured-nation" c Lauseo stat'ing
that the Agency shaLL accord to Japan a treatment "not tess favourabLe
than the treatment it accorcls to other States or a group of States'
provided that the natjcnaL system achieves and maintains a degree ofr'-'
functi,qAqL jCSg ff:: :q']valent to thatffiu or Eroup o? statFt1"- Ne\-[heGss-, tne terms of this
AEreement are not identical, to those of the Verification Agreernents"
(1) H"!th cei-tain States not signatory to the NPT' the Agency
gras conc t.ucied saf eguaros agreements of anotne?' type" based on
Document INFCIRC 65 Rev. ?. Some afe st'i l" L in force twith 'le $tates at
the end of 1gB1 ). Since these Agreements do not cCIncern NNf'lS parties
to the NpT, they cannot be cornpared with the Verittcation Agreerrreni'
/ o.o
-lo r
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The main difference arises from
of safeguards; because of its
considered to have a techn'icaL
But it Coutd not reach the same
-Euratom, si nce th i s i s based on
to the CommunitYrs suPrbnationaL inst i tut i ons -
V- Verification Agre-ements betueen Eura its N['JS and the enc
73- As a party to the NpT; 
-pnO in order to demonstrate that its status ils
a Nuc lear l,leapon state-t:(Nws) did not give i t economi c advantages'
the Unjted Kingdom, idt,1967, made a voLuntary offer to accept Agenc:/
safeguards; this resutted i; a Verification Agreement with Euratom 'lfld
the Rgency, uh.i ch !,/as s'igned on 6 September 1976. A key di f f erence, as
compaied r*ith the Verif ication Agreement (NNl,lS), is that routine Ag'ency
inspections appLy onLy to f aci Lities designated f rom time to time f r)F
this purpose: aLL other safeEuarding procedures (design information,
accounting, reports, ad hoc and speciaL inspections) appty' however' to
aL[ civi L faci Lities- 
.
Other differences are as foLl.otils;
the basic characters of the two systems
thoroughness, the Japanese system cor'rLd be
ef f ectiveness equi vatent to that of fiuratom.
degree of fulct"@ as;
a transf eiof pouers by the Member litates
the Agreement aPPties to aLL
uithin faci Lities (materiaL
- 
p!'ovision is made to enabLe
materiaLs from the scope of
reasons;
nucIear materiaLs in c'ivi L appLications
outside faciLities being thus excLuded);
the United Kingdom to withdraw nucLear
the Agreement f,or nationaL security
14. Although not a party to the NPT, France also made a voluntary offer to
accept Agency safeguards; and a Verification Agreement was signed u'ith
Euratom and the Agency on 27 JuLy 19V8. Its scope is timited to
materjaLs specificaLIy designated by France" 0theril'i se, its provis'ions
fottow cLosely those of the United Kingdom Agreement.
VI. The i Lementation of the Verification 4g@
15. Fluch uiork remained to be donen foLLouring the s;ignature of the Veri{'ication
Agreement (NNWS), before it couLd be fuLty impLemented"
InternaLLy, the Community had to revise its safeguarding ReguLatiorrs
so as to be in a pos'ition to fulf i L its obligations under the Agreement
concerning basic technicaL characterist'i cs, records and accounting
reports (*) - A neu Regulation ( 31?717il was enacted at the end oi1' 1976-
Because of the compLex work entailed in the preparation of this
Regulation (incLudirrg the tine required for the CounciL to approve it), the
Verif jcation Agreement did not enter into f orr:e unti L 21 February 1977 -
{*.} The cb l'igat
eommi ssi an
j ons concerni ng
'3n the basls of
inspectioris are di
ArticLe 81 of the
rect Ly 'impLemented bY the
Euratom TreatY.
-l ( -7
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ExternaLty" the Community had to negotiate with the Agency the specific
parts of the Subsidiany Arrangements, namety the FaciLity Attachments,
one for each facitity on the territories of the ilenrber States concerned"
The Comfrission had also to draw up internaL acts for each
faci l.ity ("ParticuLar Saf eguarding Provisions") to give ef f ect to its
internationaL commjtments deriving from the FaciLity Attachments"
16. Fo[towing the entry'into force of the Verification Agreement' but prior
to negotiation of the Faci L'ity Attachments, the Agency encountered
probtems unforeseen at the time of negotiation of the Agreement"
As indicated above, the generat part of the Subsidiary Arrangements
inctudes a section on the RuLes and ftlethods for the caLcuLation of
inspection efforts, as weLl- as specific exampLes of their appLication'
The Faci tity Attachrnents were to be draun up on this basis.
Houever certain technicaI assumptions referred to in these exampLes
were not confirmed in practice (1).
17. At the same tjme, dD important poLiticaL deveLopment supervened-
FoLtoujng the expl.osion by India of a nucLear device in 19740 the
Agency's Stand'ing Advi sory Group on Saf eguards ImpLementat ion (SAGSI)
considered quantification of the EeneraL wording of paragraph 28 of the
BLue Book (2), which refers to "time[y detection of significantquantities,,. It made recommendations to the Agency for "detection goaIs"
of generaI apptication, corresponding approximatety to thequ.ntities of materiaLs needed to produce one nuclear weapon, and to the
conversion times f rom various chemi caL f orms into bJeapcns usabLe f orm.
These detection goaLs brere presented to, and noted by, the Agency's Board
of Governors. Expressed in absolute termsn Hithout reLation to the size
or type of pl.ant, these goaLs of general appLication are translated by
the Agency using certain internat criteria" into spec'ific "inspection
goaIsi for indivjduat plants. These pLant-specific goaLs largeLy
determine the form and intensity of the aF'pl.ication of Agency safeguards
as defined in the Facility Attachments-
18. F jnal,Lyn f oLLowing the Agen cylJapan Agreernent, it was f ett by the Agency
that the way in *hirf, the Verificat'ion Agreement uouLd be'impLemented
wouLd set a precedent, not onLy for the Japanese Agreement itselfn but
aLso for any agreements with other States which might foLtow the
Japanese **u*piu and estabLish advanced nationaL safeguards systems.
19. These three deveLopments Lecl the Agency to press Euretomu during
negotiat-ion of the Faci Iity Attachmentsu to accept the fotLor.;inE
gui de Li nes ;
/"-
{t) In particutar." it has not
to put Permanent seaLs orl
seaLed storage baxes for
yet proved possjbLe, tor technicaL reasons'
Light-water reactor assembLies or to instaLL
'in-put samptes in reprocess'ing pLants"
(ai whi ch corresponds to Arti c Le 28 of the Verif i cat'ion Agreemen't
*l?-' I
(a) the Agency ef fort, shou[d be greater, in particuLar in the sensiltive
pLanti, than that bnvisaged at the time of negotiation of the
Agreement I
(b) inspection activjtd'cs to be carried out otherwise than through
observation shou*9- ** uider than those previous[y thought;
(c) Agency inspecto.r'"ihouLd use, to a Large extent, Agency surveiLLance
and containment devices (eg, cameras, seaLs).
The Community, whiLe,trefusing to consider any amendment to the text of
the Agreement or its 
"f:otocoL , er any move which couLd jeopardise tlneindependence and intgbjty of the Euratom saf eguards system' re-
aff irmed its support:f;or the effectiveness of r{gency safeguards and
dectaned itseLf ready:to discuss practicaL sotrltions to the problems
raised by the AgencY.
I
ZA. The Conrminity position took account in particuLar of the fact that the
Verification Agreement does not specify the Agency inspection effort in
absoLute terms. It cLearLy indicates that it shouLd be significantLy
Lower than the effort requi red under Agency agreements wi th other thi rd
States, and also Lower than the Euratom effort. But its actuaL
determjndtion ln,as teft to the Subsidiary Arrangements. Moreover, the
provtsions concerning inspection efforts concenn the nucLear pLants cf
the Community as a whote; they Leave open the possibi l- jty for Agency
inspectjon efforts to be substantiaLLy greater for particuLar types of
faci Lities.
'dII 
" The Euratorn/A encv compromises on the implementation of theVerification Ag reement
21. Between 1977 and 1980 a numben of compromises rlere worked out. These took
the f orm of spgciaI undqE:lanqfjnS suppLementing" in practi ce, thegeneraLpartngements.The|atterwasnotnhowever'
amended because of the provisionaI nature of the compromises and the
need to keep open the possibi Lity of revert'inE Later to the originaL
app roa ch 
"
?2. An understand'inq concerning sensitive 'instaLtatiplg {reprocessing prtants,
- ins 'ignificant quarrtities
of pl"utonium or highL)' enrjched uranium, as welL as other taci Litiers as
mutua L Ly ag reed upon i n "f uture (*) t.las worked out i n two stages, i rr
Septembe r 1977 and in Ju Ly 1978, The Comrnuni ty recogni sed the pol. i ti ca L
case for fuLl"er Agency inspections, while the Agency agreed to economise
in inspection effort, ancl to reduce inconven'ie'nce for operators' b)'forming
.lojn1 Teams eonsisting of a number of jnspectors present at the pLantgTEffilsinoperation.ItuaSprcVidecithattheywouLdwork
e Lose Ly together, and coL l.ect ciata i n common, but make i ndependent
reports" It was agreed that Agency inspection effort in Joint Teams
wou Ld in most cases be Less than Euratom ef f ort, and r+ouLd norrnaL Ly
be Less than that in a thi rd $tate-
The detinition of a Joint Team incLr.rdes jn particuLar the f oL lowin51
poi nt s:
f-..
{*'} F,lone has been s0 agreed"
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I
- a It inspection acti vi ti es
be performed by the Joint
- the purpose of the Joint
achieve their safeguards
and intrustion vis-A-vis
9*
in the pLant are considered as a task to
Team;
Team is to enable both inspectorates to
objectives with a minimum of duptication
ope rators i
inspection activities witL be undertaken in mutuat support in such a bray
as to give each organisation att information requ'i red to draw its ouJn
independent conc Lusions;
if an activity is considered as requi ring more than one inspector'
inspectors f rom both the Agency and Euratorn wi [], be present i 1f an
activity can be carrjed out by a singte inspector' it may be under-
taken by any member of the team (one job/one man)1
as far as possibLe, there shoutd be common working data and seaLsl
sampLing plans shouLd be prepared jointLy;
no hierarchicat structure was foreseen but requests to the operator
nouLd normaL Ly be channel- Led through a Euratom inspector.
This understanding r.,as provisionaL and subject to review after a period of
Z to i years; du.ing that period there shouLd be an assessment at regutar
intervaLs of the possibiLity of reducing inspection effort, in the Light
of technicaL necessity. It was, however, Later agreed that this
compromise woutd rernain in force unti L September 1983, pending a f inaL
decision in the Light of experience
?5. Another series of understand'ings retates to the probLem of Parti cipation
of the Agency in Euratom inspections other than those in instaLLatjons
subject to Joint Team operations (1)-
24. As to Iight water reactgrs, df, understanding was agreed in three stages.
Its main points ane as foLtot.ls:
a detaited inspection performed by both authorities takes pLace
approximateLy once a year, when the reactor core is open for recharging;
a,,mid-term" inspection performed by both authorities takes ptace
6 months after the detaited inspection to check the surveiLLance
equipment (to be discontinued when doubts about technicaL reIiabi Lity
of video recording system are reasonabty removed);
Euratom inspectors wi LL read seaLed cameras respectively 3 and 9 rnonths
after the main inspection (2);
1...
(1) cf , ArticLe 14(€) of the ProtocoI to the verification
stating that Agency inspectors shouLd be present during
of the Euratom insPections.
e, A fiLm is removed and taken to Luxembourg to be read by
both inspectors -
Ag reement
certain
* l'(' 10
- Agency inspectors couLd accompany Euratom inspectors during the said
inspections on 50X of the visits setected on a random basis (1).
This extra Agency'inspection shouLd be d'iscontinued as soon as
tamper-proof opti cal- survei LLance measures have been deveLoped.
This understanding, Iike that on Joint Teams, is expressLy provisionaL(unti L September 1985).
?5. Another understanding, reached in f'larch 1979, reLates
uranium f uet f abri cat ion p Lan.ts. It provides that:
to low enri ched
for "Large" pLants, Euratom shouLd inspect at intervaLs of between
two weeks and one month, and the participation of the Agency shouLd
vary f rom 5A'/, (two-week l-y Euratom i nspections) to 9Oi( (one-rnonth ty
Euratom inspections);
for "smatL" ptants, Euratom shouLd inspect at intervats of betwe'en
one andl three months and the part'icipation of the Agency shouLd aLso
vary f rjom sAX to 9A%i
I
inspe.t'ionr shouLd be made Less frequentLy as soon as equipment approved
by bot\ organisations makes this possibLe-
I
?6. A furthef understanding reLates to the question of observation (2)-
Inl,|arch,1g79itwasagreedthat,tQritern-counting_iffifor
identification and examination of records, the Agency inspectors uroutd
observe, without repeating these operations, the items and records; which
uere being checked by the Euratom inspector. However, where records
have been examined in the absence of an Agency inspector, the Latter may
have access to these.records- It was later specified that the Agency,
in jnstatLations for whjch the inspection frequency is Less than once per
month, couLd venify (on a sampLying bas'is for source documents' and in
al.L cases f or Ledgei's' exam'ination) the part of the records previousLy
exami ned by Euratom a Lone. For other insta t t.ati ons, F€cords
examinations shouLd be pLanned and carried out when both inspectorates
are present.
??. Furthermore, in March 1979, two Iists were drar,ln up concerning res;pectiveLy
the inspect'ion activi t jes to be carried out "otherwise than through
observation"("0TTO List"i and those to be carried out "through obs;erva-
tion" ("T0 tist'o).
28. At the sarne t'imeo a procedurat understanding was reached on the qLlestion
of costs of safeguards to operators. ArticLe 15 of the Verification
Rgr;Efr;;-t provides, inter aLia, that the Agency shal L bear the cos;t of
any acJditionaL measuring or sfrmpLing that its insnectors may reque'st.
In the vietnt af the Communityn the word "additjonaL" refers to any extra
measurements and sampLes the Agency may request" as opposed to thcrse made
or taken by 'the operator in furtherance of his own materiaI accouriting. or
by Euratom in furtherance of its safeguards responsibiLities. In the view
of the Agencyo however, "additionaL" refers o,t'tLy to actions by an operaton
which go beyond normaL safeguards activities as specified in the FaciLity
Attachments" Eecause it had proved impossib[e to settLe the subrstance
of the question, it was agreed that, pending definition of the LeEaL
position and of permanent arrangements, Faci tity Attachments wou[c! normaLLy
refer in generaL terms, t0 Articte 15 of the Agreemerrt.
(1) The AgencY may also
to verify materiaLs(2) CF. ArticLe 14(b) of
perform on these occasions other operations! €9'
in store or to audit records.
the Protocot to the Verification Agneement.
- 
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VIIL !urrent situation in the jIpIementaJio! !]l the Verification Agreement (NNWS)
29. It is barety three years since the last of the compromise understandings
ras reached. Neverthetess, and in spite of the complexity of the situation,
a great deaI of progress has been rnade in apptying the Agreennet. In atL,
194 faciLity Attachments have been finaLised; 60 remain to be compIeted, of uhich
most retate to instaLLations handLing very smalI quantities of nucLear materia[.
ALt outstanding FaciIity Attachments shouLd be finished by the end of 1983-
30. The outstandjng Facitity Attachments concern four categories of
i nsta [ [a t i ons:
- neH instaftations;
- facilities with speciaL probtems (eg, a mixed oxide fabricationptanti an on-toad refuetted reactor);
- instat-[ations using advanced enrichment technoLogy;
- uaste-handtinq and treatnent instal-tations.
It shoutd be noted that facilities for trhich no Attachment yet exists are
neverthetess subject to "ad hoc'.' inspections, in accordance with
Articte 71G) ol the Verification Agreenent.
31 . CLose co-ordination betL,een the respective inspectorates has been
achieved. €uraton estabtishes a six-month generaL progranme for its
inspections, enab[ing the Agency to choose those inspections at which it
vishes to be present. . Requests for changes in the programme are
nornaLty accepted by Euratom. PLanning documents for individual inspections
afe sent to the Agency in advance- If the Agency has not been present at
an inspection, Euratom subsequentLy provides it lrith a copy of the
inspection report. At the end of each inspection, Euratom provides the
Agency Hith a comptete set of rorking papers.
32. It may therefore be conctuded that the Verification Agreement is
effectivety operational- Hotdevef , its operation has given rise to a
number of orobLems: these have come to the Commissionrs attention, either
through representations from Governments or economic operators of f'lember
States, or through observation by its ovn inspectors. In the Last twetve
nonths, these prob[ems have been examined uith those concerned in the
Community, and they are no t,l being discussed vith the Agency through
appropriate channets. The important ones are raised in the High LevaI
Liaison Committee (HLLC), a body operating at senior officiaL Levet; 'it
met three times in 1982 - a much nore intense rhythm of meetings thanheretofore.
I|,tore detai [ed technicaL questions are Looked at in the Lower Levet
Liaison Comnittee (LLLc), a sidtar body but rneeting at the technicaL teveL.
In addition to these two Committees, whose establiShment was provided for
in the ProtocoL, ad hoc meetings betrreen officiats of the t!,lo
inspectorates are f requent.
33. A number of problems have been settted at one or another of the
three Ievets, and are not therefore discussed in this report- However,
the commission thinks it desirabl,e to .inform the counci I of the state of
discussion uith the Agency on the foIto|'ting outstanding issues:
i
I
1...
--l b
(1)
Q'
(5)
u,
(5)
t.
I
I
I
I
\ 
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AppLication of the observation principLe-
participation of Agency inspectors in Euratom inspections.
AppLication of the Joint Team compromise'
The taking into account by the Agency of the effectiveness
Euratom safeguards sYstem-
The burden of .inspection effort in tlember States resutting
putting into force of the verification Agreement-
of the
from the
(6) The Problern of costs.
34- As to observation, the arrangements made for the apptication of the generat
-'- p.i".i;Fml-O*n in Artic[e 14(b) of the Protocol are in generaI
;;;;.i;, itttrough in some casesthey tead to unnecessary futt repetition
of recordi checks_ moreover, the commission has noted that Agency
iispectors rather frequent[y consider it necessary to reptace the
observation of the activities carried out by the Euratom inspectors by
independent actions (eg, they use instrunents Hithout prior consuttation
uith'Euratom).DiscussionshavetakenptaceinHLLCaboutthesenatters;
it has been agreed that LLLC shoutd I'ook at them' case by case' and
report back.
35. As to oarticipation of Agency inspectors in Euraton inspections, the compromises
---^- iioffi;;i.f"""=;.q...i"0 !" ,?:."1!l:!:o Y!"1"T li"l=l:oil::ll?l ft""t'have $orked satrstacroriLy. For the former' r[-FEF not been possibLe so far to
"nult"g" a reduction 
in tire frequency of Agency inspections' because-technicaL
iq"ip.""t, such as video systems, is not yet_ sufficient[y reLiable. But the
iornlsrlon is ctosety foltowing technotogicaL devetopments *ith a vieu to
taking the necessary steps in due course'
36. As for Joint Teams, in a number of facitities it has been possibte to
achievel-iT-16i1li'Lated by the retevant understanding, their basic aim
of al,towing both organisations to draH their independent conctusions
throughmutuatsupportwithnrinimumintrusionandduplication'Houever'
inanunberofotherinstaLlations,difficu[tieshavearisen,interaLia
on the fol louing Points:
- 
use of a common set of working data and instruments;
- the one-job-one-man aPProachi
- comnon detaited inspection vork-programme;
- rutes on communication of inspectors' findings to the operators.
Discussions have taken place in HLLC' Some guideLines have atready been given.
LLLC has been instructed to study these niatters in detai I case by case.
.37.As to the tak.ing into account by the Agency of the effectiveness of the euratom
safegua rds-lil$frl-ifrl?I-i6frTt i tutes an oblisation under the verification Asree-
n"nt] tn" Aglncy,'in order to be abLe to consider the system, in the Light of
nrticLe 32 of the Agreement, has requested more information on how Euratom
safeguardswork.ThisinformationisprogressiveLybeingsupptied.llhenthe
processiscomplete,thetwoorganisationsrriLLconsidertheoperationat
consequences to be drawn.
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38. As to the burden of under the Verification
Agreementr certain lvlember States that this
night be excessive tak'ing into account the Agencyts inspection effort in
third countries" the Commission has requested the Agency to provide
relevant information- Thjs is progressiveLy being done; uhen the Drocess
is compLete, the Commission urj LL be able to form a judgment on this matter-
39. As tojg:jg, aLthough certain specific difficutties which anose in one
instal'lfi6n have noH been solved, it is necessary, in the tight of
experience, to arrive at an agreed interpretation of Articte 15 of the
Agreement. The Commission wi tL take this matter up w'ith the Agency-
The Commission has aLsc embarked on a generaL study of safeguards costs
in the CommunitY.
IX, Current situation in the imptementatjon of the Verificqtio? {9re-ement
40. The UnitecJ Kingdom Verification Agreement has been in force since
August 1978. Tr,,o f aci Li ti es were des ignated to date by the Agency
for routine inspections. No significant probLems have been encountered
in the imptementation of the Agreement, apart from the generaL problems
re[ated to Joint Teams (see paragraph 56)-
41. The French Verification Agreement entered into force in September 1981
However, as the Subsidiary Arrangements are onLy no}, being negotiated'
no experience on the imptementation of the Agreement can, as Yet, be
reported.
X. Out look
42. ImpLementation of the Verification Agreements must be a continuing process'
In an initial. phase, Euratom was conf ronted uith the double task of
adjusting its o|rn sifeguarding systern to the requirements of the Verifica-
tion Agreements, and of concLuding taciLity Attachnents for each
instal.iation concerned in the Community. The former process has been
.compteted'andtheLattersoonwittbe.Aphaseofconsoiidationand
development has notr begun"
43. During discussion of the questions referred to'in paragraph 33 above'
the Eommission has reminded the Agency that the various compronise
understandings all have a provisionat character, and that those !'lhich
reIate to Joint Team operations and to t.ight water reactors are specif icall'v
subject to review by the counciL in September 1983' The Ccmmission has
a[si haO in mind that the RuLes and ftethods laid do'n by the Subsidiarv
Arrangements (generaL part) are subject to reviehi frqm time to time'
44. As regards the understandings to be revieued next september' tlie
Commiision triIL submit to the CounciL, before the end of next June"
specific and conerete suggestions concerning their future'
As to the other understandingsn as veIl as to the probterns which.have
aiisen in the impLementation oi the Agreementt the conmission ditt report
to the Council in due course. 
,
,-Lt'
46. FinaltY, it shoul-d be noted
Agency cover matters which
Veri f i cation Agreements'
that reLations between Euratom and the'
go far beyond the apptication of the
14
0n atl these matters, the commission's thinking ui LL of course be
inftuenced by the deveiop*.nt of the ongoing discussions with
the Agency_ These discussions *uri b. seen-in a broad internationat'
context. The effective fiiaintenance of the Agency's safeguards 
system
is very important for the deveLopment of internationaL trade in
nuctear materiats, wni c* .ts a major community 'iinterest- In recent )/ears'
the Agency has faced substaniiaL difficuLties- rt is understandabLe
that it shouLd consider very'carefuLLy the impli'ications' for its
saf eguards system as a urrorL, of trre rpu.if i c arrangements it makes
rittr the community. iui it is ar.so necessary that, in accordance 
w'ith
the verification Agr"lil**; i; uh""ro find h,avs and means of takins
into account, in 
"ooryi& safegrards 
in the communitY, of the
effectiveness of the EufEtom safeguards system' thus avoiding
unnecessarY duPLication'
45. CLear[y, the probIems of apptication of the Verification Agreements 
do
not affecti in any Hay the performance by Erratom of its other safeguards
tasks, namPLY the fotLowing:
(a) verifilcation of specif ic intended civi L useso as decLared by
each lOerator;
I(b) appliNation of certa'in saf,eguards in the fuel cycte goinE beyond
those iof the ngency system tnrning activities" ore concentrati.n" etc');
(c) respect of internationaL cosnmitments entered into by the comrnurnitY going
beyond a peaceful use pledge (arrangernents for retransfersn conditions
of user etc.)1(d) ..=oiii ;;-;;"isi.ons of the Treaty r.eLatins to suppl-v"
Tlrethirdtaskimpliesthat"fot.theAgreementswithmainsuppLier
states (us, canada' nrstraLia), Euratom must be in a position to
foLtow cont'inuousLy, th,roughout the communitY" nucLear materiaLs
coming from these States"
In the fieLd of research and developrnent of safeguards technoLogy"
the tuo authorities ,o*op*rate cLoseLy, under a.specific agreement:
conc Luded i n 1981 . The Community conducts a rna jor programme' drawn
up after consuLtation with the Agencyr to whom jtt resuLts are made
avaiLabLe. (This programme is i; addition to the nationaL proErammes
of centain f{ember states.) The commissicn has aLso been participiating
sctivei-yu aLonE *iil, the ig*nry ina othe's c,cncerned, in the hexapartitegroup 
" 
Hhich:is devetoping an approach to the problem of
safesuarciing centrifuEe enr.ichment pLants. 'Ihe commission beLieves that'
because CIf its role as one of the two mur,tinationaL safeguarding
auth*rit'ies" and because of its extensive co-operation with the Agency
both on operations and on R & D, Euratom couLd make a substantiaL
contribution to tlie ngenfy's Standing ndvisory Group on Safeguards
Impt,ementat'ion (SAGSI): it has exprelsed this view to the Agency's
Di rector*GeneraL"
1...
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The Generat Co-operation Agreement concluded by Euratom and the Agency
in 1976 prov'ides a f raner*ork f or a wide range of other co-operative
activities. These incLude Commission participation in the Agency's
Committee on Assurances of SuppLy (of nuclear materiaLs), and in its
group of experts on InternationaL Ptutonium Storage- TechnicaL
co-operation has aLso been devel.oping for niany years in areas of common interesto
notabty nucLear safety, waste management, radiotogicaL protection, radio-
isotopes, training of nucLear speciaLists, and nucLear fusion.
XI. Fotlow-up i
47. The Commission invites the CounciL to consider the present report. It also
caLLs rrpon fh" wlember States to express their views on the different points
raised therLin.
The vieus 
"fpr"rr.d wiLL be of value to the Commission in its further workin this whote field.
The Commissllon further suggests that the report should be sent to fvlember
IStates Reprbsentatives to the Agency, requesting them to bear it in mind
in the frarnework of Community coordination, in particutar in view of the
forthcoming session of the Board of Governors of 2? February 1983- This
session wiLt discuss, inter aLia, the current status of the Agencyts safe-
guards and the possibi t'ities of improving the system.
r- t q'-- ;I L." ;
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